

**Federalist No. 10 (Guided Reading)**

*Publius (James Madison)*

**November 22, 1787**

**The Same Subject Continued**

AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice.

**What is the most dangerous thing to a United America?**\_\_\_\_\_

He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished,...

**What has that dangerous thing done to past governments?**\_\_\_\_\_

The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired;

**How effective does Madison think the new American Constitution will be?**\_\_\_\_\_

Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.

**Is the current government (the Articles of Confederation), following the principal of majority rule, minority rights? Yes or No**

By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

**What is a faction?**

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

**What are the 2 ways to control faction?**

A)

B)

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

**What are the 2 ways to remove the causes of faction?**

A)

B)

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy [destroy liberty] that it is worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be a lesser folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

**Why is destroying liberty a negative thing?**

The second expedient [give everyone the same opinions, passions, & interests] is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former [your opinions] will be objects to which the latter [your passions] will attach themselves.

**What causes you to have passions (or interests)?**

The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from

the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

### **What is government's purpose?**

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society...But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination.

### **What is the oldest and most common faction?**

The inference to which we are brought is that the *causes* of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its *effects*.

### **What conclusion does Madison come to?**

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution.

### **Why do the people not have to worry about the minority faction?**

When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are directed.

### **Why do the people NEED to worry about a majority faction?**

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only.

From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from

the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.

**What form of government does Madison describe? \_\_\_\_\_**  
**What will the majority faction normally do in this form of government?**

**Has this form of government been successful?    Yes or No**

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

**Which forms of government is Madison going to compare and contrast?**

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation [size] of the government, in the latter [republic], to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens and greater sphere of country over which the latter [republic] may be extended.

**What are 2 positive things about a republic?**

**A)**

**B)**

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.

**What are the 2 reasons elected representatives are better than a democracy? A)**

**B)**

Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose.

**According to Madison, who has a better idea of what “the people” want? Representatives of the people OR the people themselves**

In the first place it is to be remarked that however small the Republic may be, the Representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the constituents, and being proportionally greatest in the small republic, it follows that if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

**Is it possible to have as many representatives as people, if the government wants to prevent abuse of power? Yes or No**

**Which republic will have a greater chance of having better choices when choosing a representative? Small Republic or Large Republic**

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to center on men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

**Which republic will provide a more attractive and hard-working political candidate? Small Republic or Large Republic**

The other point of difference is the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former [republic] than in the latter [democracy]...Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other.

**What does “extend the sphere” mean?**

**Why is this a good change?**

Hence, it clearly appears that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy in controlling the effects of faction is enjoyed by a large over a small republic-is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States.

**Does Madison want a strong central government or keep the confederacy of the Articles of Confederation?**